Scientific Perspectivism in the Phenomenological Tradition by Berghofer, Philipp
Scientific Perspectivism in the Phenomenological Tradition
Philipp Berghofer
University of Graz
philipp.berghofer@uni-graz.at
Abstract
In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a
new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of
scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different
proponents  of  perspectivism  differ  in  their  respective  characterizations  of  perspectivism,  the
common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a
new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are typically mentioned
in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my
knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This
is  surprising  because  here  one  can  find  systematically  similar  ideas  and  even  a  very  similar
terminology.  It  is  startling  because  early  modern  physics  was  noticeably  influenced  by
phenomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in
the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different
forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological
tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with
current  versions  of  perspectivism.  Engaging  with  the  phenomenological  tradition  is  also  of
systematic  value  since  it  helps  us  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  distinctive  claims  of
perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism.
1. Perspectivism in current debates
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Advocating  scientific  realism,  broadly  speaking,  means  adopting  “a  positive  epistemic  attitude
toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and
unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences” (Chakravartty 2017). It is safe to say
that  scientific  realism is  the  dominant  view among  the  public.  This  is  particularly  due  to  the
undeniable success of the sciences in making predictions and in contributing to the technological
advancements  we  witness  on  a  daily  basis.  Also  among  philosophers  of  science,  the  main
motivation for adopting a realist position is the notorious miracle argument which quotes scientific
realism as the best explanation for the obvious success of our scientific theories. This success would
seem miraculous if our successful theories were misleading. Despite their initial plausibility, both
scientific realism and the miracle argument have been attacked on many fronts. Objections based on
the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data and the pessimistic meta induction
gained such prominence in the 20th century that Arthur Fine was prompted to declare: “Realism is
dead” (Fine 1984, 83). 
Currently, realism is again the dominant stance, but most realists concede that the attacks from the
anti-realist camp require clarification and some sort of constraint of realist commitments. The most
common response to the problems surrounding realism is to adopt a form of selective realism. Here
entity realism and structural realism are the most prominent examples, but each version of realism
suffers from certain shortcomings and by now scientific realism has splintered into a variety of
different positions each being vigorously attacked not only by anti-realists but also by other realists.
Accordingly, prominent voices have pointed out that the debate between realists and anti-realists
has come to a “stalemate” (cf., e.g., Chakravartty 2018, 233; Forbes 2017, 3327; Frost-Arnold 2010,
56).
So where does this leave us? In recent debates, a new version of realism has emerged that is distinct
from traditional  versions of  realism as  well  as from new versions  of selective realism.  This  is
perspectival realism or  scientific perspectivism, in short,  perspectivism. Its focus is not on certain
parts of scientific theories (as it is the case for selective realism) but it aims at rethinking the nature
and scope of scientific theories and models. The main works promoting perspectivism are Giere
2006, Massimi 2012, 2018a, 2018b, and Teller 2001, 2011. Proponents of perspectivism typically
view  their  position  as  a  via  media  between  objectivist  realism  and  all  forms  of  anti-realism.
However, there is no unified picture of perspectivism; different proponents of perspectivism differ
in their respective accounts. Here I will focus on the depiction of perspectivism offered in Giere
2006 since it seems to be closest to the ideas developed in the phenomenological tradition.
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Giere contrasts his perspectival realism with what he calls objectivist realism:
I will be arguing that there is a kind of realism that applies to scientific claims that is more 
limited than this full-blown objective realism. Thus, in the end, I wish to reject objective realism 
but still maintain a kind of realism, a perspectival realism, which I think better characterizes 
realism in science. For a perspectival realist, the strongest claims a scientist can legitimately 
make are of a qualified, conditional form: ‘According to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable
instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such.’ There is no way legitimately to take 
the further objectivist step and declare unconditionally: ‘This theory (or instrument) provides us 
with a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself.’ (Giere 2006, 5f.)
Here we find three claims about scientific theories that Giere’s perspectivism subscribes to and that
he takes to be in opposition to objective realism.
P1: Scientific theories are fallible.
P2: Scientific theories cannot be interpreted literally in their entirety.
P3: Scientific theories cannot provide a complete picture of the world.
However,  P1  and  P2  are  well-accepted  claims  and  do  not  constitute  a  distinctive  version  of
scientific realism. P1 is a claim any plausible form of scientific realism must accept. P2, as we have
seen above, is advocated by all proponents of selective realism. Accordingly, what is distinctive
about perspectivism should be encapsulated by P3. It is to be noted that P3 is an interesting and
controversial claim that has been explicitly denied by prominent voices.1 Wilfrid Sellars expresses a
widespread view within analytic philosophy of science when he says:
But, speaking as a philosopher, I am quite prepared to say that the common sense world of 
physical objects in Space and Time is unreal-that is, that there are no such things. Or, to put it 
less paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the 
measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. (Sellars 1963, 173)
As we will see below, this attitude that the common sense world is mere illusion and that science is
the measure of reality, providing an exhaustive picture of all there is, is the main target of Husserl’s
1 De Caro lists several contemporary proponents of the view that “only one true and complete description of the 
world exists, which is typically regarded as being offered by the natural sciences, especially physics” in (De Caro 
2020, 58).
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phenomenological philosophy of science. Sellars’ claim is also clearly opposed to P3. Let us take a
closer look at how Giere motivates P3.
Giere focuses on three sources of human knowledge, arguing that all three of them only deliver
perspectival knowledge. These three sources are color vision, scientific observation, and scientific
theories. Concerning color vision, Giere summarizes his line of reasoning as follows:
For my purposes, maybe the most important feature of perspectives is that they are always 
partial. When looking out at a scene, a typical human trichromat is visually affected by only a 
narrow range of all the electromagnetic radiation available. In particular, the nearby wavelengths 
in the ultraviolet and infrared are simply not visually detected. And of course there is no 
possibility of visually detecting gamma rays or neutrinos. (Giere 2006, 35)
Giere is obviously right in stating that human color vision is perspectival in the sense of being
partial and incomplete. What we call light, i.e., the visible spectrum, is only a very limited portion
of the electromagnetic spectrum. The question is whether this is a philosophically interesting fact
that suggests preferring perspectival realism over objectivist realism. Before we turn to this question
in more detail, let us have a look at Giere’s further arguments based on his accounts of scientific
observation and scientific theories.
His  argument  for  the  genuinely  perspectival  character  of  scientific  observation  resembles  his
argument concerning color vision.
Humans and various other electromagnetic detectors respond differently to different 
electromagnetic spectra. Moreover, humans and various other electromagnetic detectors may 
face the same spectrum of electromagnetic radiation and yet have different responses to it. In all 
cases, the response of any particular detector, including a human, is a function of both the 
character of the particular electromagnetic spectrum encountered and the character of the 
detector. Each detector views the electromagnetic world from its own perspective. Every 
observation is perspectival in this sense. (Giere 2006, 48)
For  Giere,  scientific  observation  is  observation  via  instruments.  But  scientific  instruments  are
structurally similar to human color vision in that human eyes as well as scientific instruments only
engage with a limited scope of the electromagnetic spectrum. How we perceive the world, what we
observe, and what data we gain crucially depends on the make-up of the respective methods we use
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to  observe.  Giere  illustrates  this  by discussing  how different  types  of  telescopes  produce  very
different images of the Milky Way (Giere 2006, 45-49).
The  problem with  Giere’s  line  of  reasoning,  as  discussed  so  far,  is  that  when we look  at  the
examples he discusses, it remains unclear why there should be a clash with standard or objectivist
scientific realism. What is the distinctive claim of perspectivism, embodied by the examples Giere
provides, that standard forms of scientific realism must reject? Objectivist realists can clearly accept
the fact that human vision and scientific observation only reveal limited aspects of nature. What
they would insist on, however, is that the physical objects in question objectively and truly have the
features ascribed to them. So when we say that from perspective X the object O has the feature F1
and from perspective Y the same object O has the feature F2, but F1 and F2 are not inconsistent,
then there is no problem for objectivist realism.
In this  context,  Chakravartty indicates  that in order  to be interesting and at  odds with realism,
perspectivism must  amount  to  “one  or  another  form of  relativism”  (Chakravartty  2010,  406).
However, this objection is problematic since Giere explicitly rejects “the unanalyzed assumption
that  a  robust  scientific  realism  must  be  objectivist  realism  because  otherwise  it  slides  into
constructivism or relativism” (Giere 2006, 92). The problem is that Giere is not very precise in
specifying  the  distinctive  feature  of  perspectival  realism that  makes  his  form of  realism non-
objectivist but also non-relativist. 
Chakravartty aims at clarification by making the following distinction:
As a philosophically controversial thesis, then, perspectivism would seem to take the form of 
either one or possibly both of the following claims: (In the sciences, in connection with 
representations such as theories and models, ...)
P1. We have knowledge of perspectival facts only, because non-perspectival facts are beyond our
epistemic grasp.
P2. We have knowledge of perspectival facts only, because there are no non-perspectival facts to 
be known. (Chakravartty 2010, 407)
Chakravartty argues that none of the arguments and examples Giere provides support either of these
strong theses. What is more, Chakravartty claims that there are simple counter-examples to P1 and
P2. Such counter-examples are any facts that are intrinsically non-perspectival and can be known
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via scientific observation. “It is a non-perspectival fact about charged bodies, for example, that they
exert electrostatic forces on other charged bodies” (Chakravartty 2010, 407).
It is hard to tell how Giere would respond to such examples. This is because Giere does not talk in
terms of facts. Terms such as “scientific fact” or “perspectival fact” do not occur in Giere 2006.
Instead,  he  stresses  that  scientific  knowledge is  always  incomplete.  With  respect  to  naked-eye
observation and scientific observation, he argues that they are always partial in the sense that they
only capture certain aspects of the observed object as they appear from a certain perspective. This is
a plausible claim. Importantly, this claim is not at odds with the claim that there are objective facts
and that we can have knowledge of these facts. From my perspective, it appears that there is a
laptop on my desk, this visual experience justifies me in believing that there is laptop on my desk,
and it  is  objectively true that there is  a laptop on my desk.  We can think of similar  examples
regarding scientific observations. Accordingly, Giere’s claim that observation is perspectival and
never provides a complete picture of the observed is not at odds with realism.
However,  we can see how Giere’s  perspectivism might be at  odds with  objectivist  realism. By
objectivist  realism,  apparently,  Giere understands the view that  the sciences  deliver  a  complete
picture of the world that is  free from all subjective factors. It is not only the case that the world
really has the features ascribed to it by science, there is nothing to know about the world over and
above what  is  described by our best  (possible)  scientific theories.  This means that when Giere
discusses the perspectival character of scientific theories (Giere 2006, chapter 4), he argues that
scientific  theories  are  systematically  similar  to  color  vision  and  scientific  observation.
Unfortunately, Giere’s discussion of scientific theories is a bit messy. He captures the basic claim
“that  theoretical  claims  are  also  perspectival”  in  many  different  ways,  suggesting  many
nonequivalent formulations and theses. Although he provides a general picture, the individual theses
are not fleshed out in much detail. It would go beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss
these controversial theses in detail. In what follows in this section, I will list some of these theses
that I consider particularly interesting. In what follows in this paper, I will show what role these
claims play in the phenomenological tradition.
T1) Science itself is only a certain perspective we can have on the world. To describe or explain 
certain phenomena by virtue of a scientific theory, means to adopt a scientific perspective.2
2 “But surely, it will be objected, scientists draw conclusions going beyond their instrumentation. Indeed they do. But
they do so only by moving to a broader theoretical perspective” (Giere 2006, 49).
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T2) Science and scientific theories can never deliver an exhaustive account of the world.3
T3) If two scientific theories are inconsistent with each other, it does not follow that at least one 
of them is false. They might both shed light on different aspects of nature (cf. Giere 2006, 62, 
94).
T4) There is not and there cannot be one all-encompassing scientific theory to which all the other
scientific theories can be reduced.
T5) Science cannot be totally detached from the scientist who is doing science.4
In  the  following  section,  I  will  shed light  on  Husserl’s  conception  of  horizontal  intentionality,
highlighting systematic similarities to Giere’s account of the perspectival character of observation.
In section 3, I illustrate that the claims T1, T2, and T5 play important roles in the phenomenological
tradition.  In  section  4,  I  discuss  Merleau-Ponty’s  partial  realism  that  can  be  considered  a
radicalization of T5.
2. Horizontal intentionality
As elaborated in the previous section, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project
of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between
traditional  forms  of  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism.  One  such  approach  is  perspectivism.
Although  different  proponents  of  perspectivism  differ  in  their  respective  characterizations  of
perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete.
This  epistemological claim can be supplemented by the stronger  ontological thesis that the world
itself is perspectival in the sense that at least some scientific facts are perspectival. Also, one can
supplement it with the strong methodological claim that science must become aware of the fact that
it  is  an  agent-based  endeavor  in  that  it  incorporates  the  first-person  perspective  into  science.
Science must incorporate the scientist into science.5
Perspectivism is a new position in recent debates but surely it has its forerunners. Massimi, for
instance, points out that perspectivism “has a distinguished philosophical pedigree back to Leibniz,
Kant, Nietzsche, and even Wittgenstein” (Massimi 2012, 25; cf. also Teller 2020). Matthew Brown
argues that similar ideas can be found in Feyerabend and Dewey (Brown 2009; cf. also Giere 2016).
3 “My reply is that theoretical claims are also perspectival. The basic idea is that conception is a lot like perception, 
or, that theorizing is a lot like observing. More specifically, in creating theories, I will argue, scientists create 
perspectives within which to conceive of aspects of the world” (Giere 2006, 50).
4 “[T]he picture of science that emerges is an agent-based picture” (Giere 2006, 63). Cf. also Giere 2010.
5 We will revisit this distinction between methodological and ontological claims towards the end of section 4.
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Obviously,  there are important similarities to ideas we find in Kuhn (Giere 2006; 2013) and in
Putnam (De Caro 2020; Massimi 2018b).6 Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that
discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition.7 This is surprising because here one can
find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early
modern  physics  was  noticeably  influenced  by  phenomenological  ideas.8 And  it  is  unfortunate
because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to get
a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper
is historical: to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy
of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. However, there
is also a systematic value in shedding light on the philosophy of science in the phenomenological
tradition because it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism
and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism. Since it is one of the main problems of current
perspectivism to make clear how exactly it differs from standard forms of realism or anti-realism,
the  present  elaboration  can  contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  distinctiveness  of
perspectivism. We will start with claims shared by most phenomenologists (section 3) and see how
these ideas can be radicalized (section 4).
This section discusses Husserl’s conception of horizontal intentionality, clarifying to what degree it
is in agreement with Giere’s analysis of the partial nature of observation. We will also get a first
glimpse of the phenomenological doctrine that there is no view from nowhere available, not even to
science.
One  of  Husserl’s  main  contributions  to  a  proper  phenomenological  analysis  of  perceptual
experience  is  his  disclosure  of  what  he calls  the  horizontal  structure  of  experience.  Perceptual
experiences go beyond what is directly given.9 When you look at the laptop in front of you, your
experience presents to you the laptop’s screen, case, keyboard, etc. Your experience has a presentive
6 “Like Putnam’s internal realism, perspectivism too is reacting against metaphysical realism and the so-called God’s 
eye view […]  There cannot be an objective, unique, true description of the way the world is as soon as we 
acknowledge that our scientific knowledge is always from a specific vantage point” (Massimi 2018b, 165).
7 Two new volumes on perspectivim were published in 2020 (Cretu & Massimi 2020 and Massimi & McCoy 2020). 
None of the contributions addresses the phenomenological tradition.
8 For instance, Husserl’s phenomenology had a great influence on Hermann Weyl and the development of his gauge 
principle (cf. Ryckman 2005; and Ryckman forthcoming).
9 Here, many of Husserl’s insights are in agreement with the findings of early experimental psychologists such as 
Gestalt psychologists and the members of the Graz school. These ideas have been picked up in the recent 
movement of experimental phenomenology (cf. Albertazzi 2013). Although neglected for a long time, in the 
analytic tradition, there have recently been attempts to capture this distinctive character of perceptual experiences 
(e.g., Church 2013, 50). Particularly notable works in this context that blur the artificial distinction between analytic
philosophy and phenomenology are Madary 2017 and Smith 2010.
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or in Husserl’s terminology a self-giving character with respect to these aspects of your laptop. But
your perceptual experience does not only intend these directly perceived aspects. What is co-given
to you within experience is the laptop’s back, that its back has certain properties such as a smooth
surface, that it also has a smooth underside, etc. You do not actually see the back or underside of
your laptop but they are co-intended aspects of your experience.
Furthermore, the laptop is not experienced as an isolated object but as embedded in a surrounding
world. Even if your attention is solely directed at the laptop, it is part of your experience that the
laptop does not float around in nothingness, but is placed on a desk, which in turn stands on the
floor here in your office at the department of your university in your hometown and so on. In
Husserl’s terminology, these co-given objects (desk, floor, etc.) are part of the outer horizon of your
experience. The hidden but co-intended aspects of the object itself (the laptop) are part of the inner
horizon of your experience (Husserl 1972, 28). Husserl characterizes the perspectival character of
perception as follows:
Of necessity a physical thing can be given only ‘one-sidedly;’ […] A physical thing is necessarily
given in mere ‘modes of appearance’ in which necessarily a core of ‘what is actually presented’ 
is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of ‘co-givenness,’ which is not givenness 
proper. (Husserl 1982, 94)
This means that perception always “implies a plus ultra” (Husserl 2001, 48). According to Husserl,
the  perspectival  character  and  horizontal  structure  of  perception  is  not  simply  a  result  of  the
imperfection of human beings but an essential property of perception. Not even a god could change
that perceptual experiences present their physical objects always in perspectives (Husserl 1982, 95).
When  Husserl  illuminates  the  perspectival  character  of  perception,  he  not  only  stresses  that
perception is incomplete but also that physical objects in perception always appear from a certain
point of view. 
All orientation is thereby related to a null-point of orientation, or a null-thing, a function which 
my own body has, the body of the perceiver. And again, the perspectival mode of givenness of 
every perceptual thing and of each of its perceptual determinations – on the other hand, also of 
the entire unitary field of perception, that of the total spatial perception – is something new. The 
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differences of perspective clearly are inseparably connected with the subjective differences of 
orientation and of the modes of givenness in sides.10 (Husserl 1977, 121)
A further aspect of perception is that previous experiences shape the way we perceive. Perception is
not a faculty that allows us to see the world as it  is objectively,  independent from our history,
background beliefs, etc. To put it differently, “experience is not an opening through which a world,
existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it  is not a mere taking of
something  alien  to  consciousness  into  consciousness”  (Husserl  1969,  232).  This  aspect  of
perception is closely related to discussions about the theory-ladenness of perception.
Obviously, there are many similarities between Husserl’s conception of horizontal intentionality and
Giere’s analysis of perception. For Giere, human perception is always incomplete because we only
engage with a restricted part of the electromagnetic spectrum. For Husserl, perception is essentially
incomplete because it presents its objects only one-sidedly and from a specific perspective. What is
more,  perception  is  shaped  by  subjective  factors  such  as  one’s  history,  culture,  or  previous
experiences. It should be noted, however, that there are also crucial differences between Husserl and
Giere. Husserl aims at making a general point about perceptual experiences based on descriptive
phenomenological  reflection.  For  Husserl,  it  is  essentially  (a  priori)  true  that  the  object  of  a
perceptual experience, i.e., a physical object extended in space, can only be given perspectivally.
Giere’s reasoning, on the other hand, is based on results of the empirical sciences, particularly on
how human eyes interact with the electromagnetic spectrum. Notwithstanding the differences in
scope and methodology,  this  might  be a good example where phenomenological  and empirical
investigations come to similar conclusions, thereby complementing each other.
Although  perceptual  experiences  are  necessarily  perspectival  and  also  shaped  by  previous
experiences and further subjective factors, for Husserl this does not mean that perception cannot be
a  source  of  epistemic  justification.  In  fact,  for  Husserl,  perceptual  experiences  are  the  prime
examples  of  sources  of  justification.  According  to  Husserlian  phenomenology,  epistemology is
intrinsically linked to the study of the intentional structures of consciousness. The most fundamental
epistemological question turns out to be how subjectivity can be the source of knowledge (cf. Melle
in  Husserl  1984,  page  XXXI).  Subjectivity  is  not  only  at  the  center  of  epistemology because
10 A similar remark can be found in Husserl 1973, 116f. It is interesting to see that the phenomenologically minded 
mathematician and physicist Hermann Weyl, father of the gauge principle which is one of the cornerstones of 
modern physics, basically makes the same claim, intentionally using phenomenological terminology (quoted and 
discussed in Ryckman 2005, 131).
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justification is always justification for a subject. More importantly, justification is gained through
subjective acts: “Subjective acts motivate everything” (Husserl 1984, 121). Here “subjective acts”
simply means intentionally directed mental states of a subject.  But which acts  are justification-
conferring? The answer is experiences. More precisely, those mental states that have a presentive
character, that present their objects in an intuitive (“anschaulich”) manner. For Husserl, this not only
includes perceptual experiences but also, e.g., introspective intuitions and a priori intuitions (for
more  details  on  Husserl’s  conception  of  experiential  justification,  cf.  Berghofer  2018a  and
Berghofer  2020).  As we have seen above, although Husserl  regards experiences as a  source of
immediate justification, he is well aware that experiences are not windows to the world through
which we see how the world is in itself thoroughly objectively. Instead, experiences present their
objects  in  a  certain  way  that  at  least  partly  depends  on  subjective  factors  such  as  previous
experiences, background beliefs, etc. In this context, Husserl emphasizes the role of transcendental
subjectivity.
Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or 
transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that 
constitutes sense and being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something 
lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the 
two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong 
together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in 
the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the 
universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely – nonsense. (Husserl 1960, 84)
Passages like this have led to much controversy in Husserl scholarship, some interpreting this as a
methodological claim (as I do), others interpreting it as a commitment to metaphysical idealism. For
our purpose, it suffices to note that for Husserl a view from nowhere at the world is in principle
impossible.  This  is  true  not  only for  our  perceptual  encounter  with  the world but  also for  our
scientific encounter.
3. The scientific perspective
Husserl’s main work concerning philosophy of science is his The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology. According to Husserl, the success of modern science (beginning
with  Galileo),  i.e.,  the  success  of  mathematizing  and  quantizing  nature,  has  led  to  several
misunderstandings. Firstly, it made scientists, as well as philosophers, believe that the methods of
11
science are the only legitimate forms of gaining knowledge. Husserl opposes this methodological
naturalism that implies that even philosophy must proceed like a natural science. Secondly, Husserl
bemoans  that  due  to  the  objectivism of  modern  age  it  has  become  commonplace  to  take  the
mathematical models and formulae to be the true reality, while the life-world, the world of our
everyday experiences,  the  world of  tables  and chairs,  is  demoted to  some kind of  illusion  (cf.
particularly Husserl 1970, 48-53).11 Husserl emphasizes that mathematics and geometry are only
methods  to  describe  physical  reality,  they are  not  the  “true”  reality  lying  behind what  we can
intuitively (“anschaulich”) observe. What he criticizes is that scientists and philosophers seem to
have forgotten this and tend to confuse what is a method with what is reality. He stresses that the
life-world  serves  as  the  epistemic  grounding12 and  the  meaning-foundation  of  all  scientific
activities.13
Husserl’s conception of the life-world proved useful in many contexts and his thesis that the life-
world remains the epistemic foundation for any scientific theory should be particularly interesting
to proponents of perspectivism.14 However, if you wish to abstain from using the terminology of a
life-world,  the basic idea remains that no matter how abstract your scientific theories are,  their
justification, ultimately, lies in ordinary experiences, in what is immediately given. In Husserl’s
words, “the inductive scientific judging” of the “exact objective sciences that by going beyond the
immediately  experienced  deduces  the  non-experienced  is  always  dependent  on  its  ultimate
legitimizing basis, on the immediate data of experience” (Husserl 1973, 121; my translation).
To be sure, Husserl neither criticizes science per se nor its methods. And, of course, he does not
dispute its success. The sciences, particularly physics, are extremely successful in what they are
11 Following Jeffrey Barrett (Barrett 1999, 116), Huggett and Wüthrich recently defined “a theory to be empirically 
incoherent in case the truth of the theory undermines our empirical justification for believing it to be true” (Huggett 
& Wüthrich 2013, 277). Hence, if the life-world is the epistemic foundation of mathematical physics, but 
mathematical physics is interpreted as revealing that the life-world is a mere illusion, this interpretation of physics 
is empirically incoherent. Note that this is not to say that our ordinary world of tables and chairs is ontologically 
fundamental. It may well be that physics reveals that our ordinary world is, so to speak, an emergent world, 
emerging from more fundamental physics such as quantum field theory. For similar discussions in the philosophy of
quantum gravity of what it would mean for the very endeavor of physics if it turned out that space and time are not 
fundamental, cf. Huggett & Wüthrich 2013 and Oriti 2014. We must not forget that “[a] central concern of 
philosophy of science is understanding how the theoretical connects to the empirical, the nature and significance of 
‘saving the phenomena’” (Huggett & Wüthrich 2013, 276).
12 “Straightforward experience, in which the life-world is given, is the ultimate foundation of all objective 
knowledge” (Husserl 1970, 226).
13 “But the researcher of nature does not make clear to himself that the constant fundament of his—after all subjective
—work of thought is the surrounding life-world; it is always presupposed as the ground, as the field of work upon 
which alone his questions, his methods of thought, make sense” (Husserl 1970, 295).
14 Giere states that Jakob von Uexkull’s conception of Umwelt “is a more elaborate version of what I am calling a 
perspective” (Giere 2006, 36). He notes that “this term is borrowed from Husserl, or at least related to Husserl’s use
of this term, but I am not in a position to explore this possible connection” (Giere 2006, 123).
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doing.  However,  he criticizes  the  conclusions  naturalists  and objectivist  realists  draw from the
success of science. According to Husserl, the scientific method is not the only method of gaining
knowledge, science does not provide an exhaustive picture of nature, and science is not completely
independent from subjective factors.
Edith Stein, one of Husserl’s foremost pupils, put it this way: “What physics [...] reveals pertains to
the real nature but it never exhausts nature. And what evades the web of mathematical formulas is
not less ‘real’ than what is captured by mathematics” (Stein 2004, 62). Here we find three motifs
that are typical for a phenomenology of physics. First, phenomenology does not dispute the success
of physics, neither does it object to the implementation of mathematics. Secondly, however, the
mathematical  picture delivered by physics only reveals one perspective of nature.15 Even if  we
manage to get a mathematical grip on nature, what we gain from this can never be an exhaustive
picture of nature. “We have seen that the methods of the exact natural sciences do not capture
reality in its totality, instead they are only concerned with certain sides of nature” (Stein 2004, 73).16
Thirdly, not being mathematizable does not imply not being real. This is not only true for certain
aspects of nature but also for totally different entities including values, essences, and consciousness.
Mathematics is extremely useful in physics but this does not imply that any science (including
philosophy, value theory, etc.) must attempt to mathematize its objects.
The idea that scientific knowledge is perspectival and dependent upon the scientist’s experiences
and life-world features also prominently in the work of Merleau-Ponty. “Everything that I know
about  the world,  even through science,  I  know from a perspective that  is  my own or from an
experience  of  the  world  without  which  scientific  symbols  would  be  meaningless.  The  entire
universe of science is constructed upon the lived world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxii).
Importantly, such phenomenological reflections on the basic epistemic role of the life-world are
supported by recent conceptions of agent-based modeling (Giere 2010) and by experimental results
concerning the relationship between perceptual and conceptual learning (Landy & Goldstone 2007).
The upshot is as follows: All we know about the physical world, we know, ultimately, by way of
15 “Any understanding of reality is by definition perspectival. Effacing our perspective does not bring us any closer to 
the world. It merely prevents us from understanding anything about the world at all.” (Zahavi 2019, 28)
16 “Phenomenology is not out to dispute the value of science and is not denying that scientific investigations can lead 
to new insights and expand our understanding of reality. But phenomenologists do reject the idea that natural 
science can provide an exhaustive account of reality. Importantly, this does not entail that phenomenology is, as 
such, opposed to quantitative methods and studies. The latter are excellent, but only when addressing quantitative 
questions.” (Zahavi 2019, 52)
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perceptual experiences. But our experiences do not constitute some magical purely objective view
from nowhere. Our experiences are shaped by previous experiences as well as by our beliefs and
expectations.  What  is  more,  perceptual  experiences  affect  our  concept  formation  and  symbolic
thinking, and the concepts we use, in turn, affect our experiences. Accordingly, when we do physics,
when we establish a mathematical model that is intentionally directed at the world, we do not have a
purely objective  mathematical  model  on the one  hand and objective  reality on the  other  hand.
Instead, on both sides we have models influenced by subjective factors.
Referring to a famous example put forward by Arthur Eddington (Eddington 1928, ixf.),  I may
exemplify the above as follows: Looking at this table in front of me is a perceptual act (precisely
but perspectivally) directed at this table in front of me. A physical-mathematical model of this table,
describing its atomic structure etc., is also (precisely but perspectivally) directed at this table. Both
are legitimate ways of being intentionally directed at the table, each elucidating different aspects of
the same object.17 They complement each other and in certain ways they influence each other. They
are both legitimate perspectives, one of them being epistemologically more fundamental. It is our
everyday experience that is epistemologically more fundamental because this is the one from which
our mathematical model arises and the one the mathematical model, ultimately, must conform to.18
We know from Mirja Hartimo’s analysis  of Husserl’s  private library that  Husserl  was not only
interested in modern physics but that he studied it in great detail (Hartimo 2018). However, Husserl
never  practiced  philosophy of  physics  in  a  narrow sense.  He never  engaged with,  say general
relativity,  to  draw  philosophical  conclusions.  And  he  never  attempted  a  phenomenological
interpretation or grounding of general relativity or quantum mechanics.19 This is a bit surprising
since  many  physicists,  as  well  as  many philosophers  of  physics,  believe  that  the  downfall  of
17 A similar approach to Eddington’s example has been championed by Putnam, who explicitly refers to Husserl in 
this context (Putnam 1987). Cf. De Caro 2020 for affinities between Putnam and perspectivism. Cf. Zahavi 2004 
for affinities between Putnam and the phenomenological tradition.
18 One might argue that while the life-world-perspective is epistemologically more fundamental than the scientific 
perspective, the scientific perspective reveals ontologically more fundamental aspects in the sense that ordinary 
objects such as tables and chairs somehow emerge from elementary particles and quantum fields. I see no reason 
why phenomenologists should deny such a claim.
19 We do know, however, that Husserl was greatly interested in such a project. This is why he supported the work of 
his pupil Oskar Becker who aimed precisely at a phenomenological grounding of general relativity. In a letter to 
Weyl, Husserl wrote: “It [Becker’s Habilitation] is nothing less than a synthesis of Einstein’s and yours discoveries 
with my phenomenological investigations on nature. […] What will Einstein say when it is shown that nature 
requires a relativity-theoretical structure on the a priori grounds of phenomenology and not on positivistic 
principles, and that only in this way a completely understandable, and ultimately exact, science is possible.” 
(Husserl in Mancosu & Ryckman 2005, 160f.)
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classical mechanics and the rise of general relativity and particularly quantum mechanics support
key ideas of Husserl’s phenomenology of science.20
Concerning general relativity, Merleau-Ponty states:
The physics of relativity confirms that absolute and final objectivity is a mere dream by showing 
how each particular observation is strictly linked to the location of the observer and cannot be 
abstracted from this particular situation; it also rejects the notion of an absolute observer. We can 
no longer flatter ourselves with the idea that, in science, the exercise of a pure and unsituated 
intellect can allow us to gain access to an object free of all human traces, just as God would see 
it. This does not make the need for scientific research any less pressing; in fact, the only thing 
under attack is the dogmatism of a science that thinks itself capable of absolute and complete 
knowledge. We are simply doing justice to each of the variety of elements in human experience 
and, in particular, to sensory perception. (Merleau-Ponty 2004, 44f.)
It  is  to  be  noted  that  Merleau-Ponty’s  remark  is  misleading  since  in  the  theory  of  relativity
observation  is  not  linked  to  the  location  of  the  observer  but  to  the  frame  of  reference of  the
observer.21 The principle of relativity implies that there is no privileged frame of reference; the laws
of  physics  are  the  same in  all  inertial  frames  of  reference.  Special  relativity is  built  upon the
principle  of  relativity (first  postulate)  and the postulate  that  in  a  vacuum the speed of  light  is
constant for all observers. Together, these two postulates have several implications that show that
some of the facts that we usually consider to be “objective” are in fact observer-dependent. For
instance, special relativity implies the relativity of simultaneity: It depends on the observer’s frame
of reference whether two events separated in space occur at the same time. There is no objective or
absolute sense in which we could tell that two spatially separate events take place simultaneously.
When  we turn  to  general relativity,  we see  that  space  and  time  are  not  absolute,  not  a  fixed
background, but that the geometry of spacetime itself is influenced by what is going on within
spacetime,  namely  by  the  energy-momentum of  matter.  This  means  that  there  is  a  reciprocal
relationship between spacetime and what it contains (including the embodied observer).22
20 The classical phenomenologists most explicitly arguing that phenomenology and modern physics can in one way or
another complement each other are Oskar Becker and Merleau-Ponty. Hermann Weyl and Fritz London are notable 
figures in early modern physics making similar claims. For phenomenological motifs in Hermann Weyl’s 
development of the gauge principle, cf. Ryckman 2005 and Ryckman forthcoming; for phenomenological motifs in 
Fritz London’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, cf. French 2002 and French forthcoming.
21 I am thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing me on making this clarification.
22 As a side note, it has been argued that general covariance in general relativity (and more precisely gauge invariance 
in a broader context) “is an indication of the relational character of fundamental observables in physics” (Rovelli 
2014, 103). It would be worthwhile to discuss whether general covariance and gauge invariance support 
perspectivist and phenomenological approaches.
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All this deserves phenomenological reflections on its own, but the theory of relativity is no focus of
this  paper.  Instead,  in  the  following  two  sections,  we  will  address  how  perspectivist  and
phenomenological  approaches  to  science  relate  to  quantum mechanics.  This  focus  on  quantum
mechanics  arises  naturally  because  when  Merleau-Ponty  spells  out  his  phenomenological
perspectivism, he crucially draws on quantum mechanics. Among the most famous of the classical
phenomenologists (Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Stein, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), Merleau-Ponty was
the  one  most  explicitly  engaging  with  the  natural  sciences.  He  believed  that  modern  physics
supports phenomenological approaches to science and reality and although he also engaged with the
theory  of  relativity,  he  believed  that  quantum  mechanics  best  supports  phenomenological
approaches. In the following section, we shed light on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of physics,
emphasizing how he radicalizes ideas we find in Husserl. In the final section, we shall see that there
are interesting systematic similarities between ideas we find in Merleau-Ponty and a current popular
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
4. Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism
Merleau-Ponty has a reputation for having deeply cared about  the natural sciences,  particularly
psychology.  This  makes  him a  promising  and  popular  point  of  origin  for  many contemporary
phenomenologists working on the interface to psychology and the cognitive sciences. It is less well
known,  however,  that  he  also  explicitly  addressed  physics,  contemplating  how philosophy and
physics can enrich each other and what a phenomenologically grounded physics may look like. This
is  particularly true  for  his  “Modern  Science  and Nature”  which  is  part  of  the  lecture  courses
published in La Nature. Here, Merleau-Ponty carefully engages with quantum mechanics, outlining
his phenomenological approach to physics.
Merleau-Ponty discusses the limits of objectivity and aims at a physics that takes into consideration
the physicist who observes and experiments. He believes that modern physics, particularly quantum
mechanics, exemplifies or at least leads to a new kind of science that engages in self-criticism,
reflectively addressing its relationship to the objects it studies (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 85). In this
context,  he  discusses  and  draws  on  the  interpretation  of  measurement  in  quantum  mechanics
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delivered by London and Bauer (London & Bauer 1939; 1983) that was itself heavily influenced by
Husserl’s phenomenology.23
For Merleau-Ponty, physics in its most perfected form abandons the idea of delivering a completely
objective picture of the world. Instead, physics needs to put the physicist into physics and account
for the fact that the life-world predates all scientific endeavors. In his words:
But a physics that has learned to situate the physicist physically, a psychology that has learned to 
situate the psychologist in the socio-historical world, have lost the illusion of the absolute view 
from above: they do not only tolerate, they enjoin a radical examination of our belongingness to 
the world before all science. (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 27)
There is an increasing number of philosophers and physicists who insist “that immediate experience
and the world can never be separated” and agree that science cannot “give us a complete, objective
description  of  cosmic  history,  distinct  from us  and our  perception  of  it.”24 Doubting  “that  the
physical object in itself” pre-exists physics, Merleau-Ponty considers the “relations between the
observer  and  the  observed”  to  be  the  “ultimate  physical  beings”  (Merleau-Ponty  1968,  15).
Underpinned by the London & Bauer account of quantum mechanics, he doubts “the idea that every
object has an individual existence,”  and instead refers to physical objects  as “generic realities”
(Merleau-Ponty 2003, 92). 
Furthermore, he explicitly addresses one of the most important questions of philosophy of science:
What do we observe in scientific measurements? Of course, this question is particularly pressing in
quantum mechanics.  Contrasting  the  role  of  the  measuring  apparatus  in  classical  physics  and
quantum mechanics, Merleau-Ponty states that while classically “the apparatus is the prolongation
23 This monograph of London and Bauer basically has two objectives: First, to provide a “concise and simple” 
(London & Bauer 1983, 219) account of the measurement problem in the spirit of von Neumann’s groundbreaking 
Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (1932). Providing the axiomatic foundations of quantum 
mechanics, von Neumann’s book was one of the most influential works of early quantum mechanics. London and 
Bauer were in broad agreement with von Neumann. They did not understand their monograph as a counter project 
but as a more accessible version of von Neumann’s highly technical work which was written in German. Secondly, 
London and Bauer shed more light on the relationship between the observed and the observer, aiming at clarifying 
the role of consciousness in quantum measurement. In perfect agreement with Merleau-Ponty they hold that modern
physics reveals that “the idea of an observable world totally independent of the observer, was a vacuous idea” 
(London & Bauer 1983, 220). For an analysis of the phenomenological motifs in Fritz London’s approach to 
quantum mechanics and for how this approach can serve as a starting point for a genuinely phenomenological 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, cf. French 2002 and particularly French forthcoming.
24 The quoted article by Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, and Evan Thompson is a great example: 
https://aeon.co/essays/the-blind-spot-of-science-is-the-neglect-of-lived-experience?
fbclid=IwAR1QpuiKEPuaE3aH37xTZA6bhHs9vstxBXt_Znw84NFkSEBdj389BuAirsA. Retrieved on February 
13, 2020.
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of our senses” in quantum mechanics “[t]he apparatus does not present the object to us.” Instead,
“[i]t realizes a sampling of this phenomenon as well as a fixation. […] Known nature is artificial
nature” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 93).
Unfortunately,  Merleau-Ponty  does  not  offer  a  detailed  and  sophisticated  analysis  of  what  is
“artificial” about quantum measurements. In general, in his discussion of quantum mechanics we
find much that is inspiring and helpful but his remarks are often vague and in order to advance
current  debates  we  would  need  a  more  precise  analysis  of  how  quantum mechanics  supports
perspectivist  and  phenomenological  approaches.  The  next  section  is  intended  to  make  a  step
towards  this  goal.  This  being  said,  I  believe  that  Merleau-Ponty  is  right  and  that  there  is  a
fundamental difference between looking through telescopes or microscopes on the one hand and
using  measuring devices in quantum mechanics on the other hand. In the case of telescopes and
microscopes,  there is  a  rather  straightforward sense in which we directly observe the object in
question.  But  it  would  be  quite  a  stretch  to  say  that  the  same  is  true  when  looking  at  the
photographs gained by cloud chambers and bubble chambers that visualize the  tracks of charged
particles.25 What is more, while cloud chambers and bubble chambers have a photographic readout,
the devices that are now common, such as particle colliders like the LHC, have a purely electronic
readout. What we gain from LHC experiments is data – big data.  “Data pours out of the LHC
detectors at a blistering rate. Even after filtering out 99% of it, in 2018 we gathered 88 petabytes of
data.”26 I  do not say that there is anything genuinely problematic about this process but it  is a
process that needs careful philosophical-phenomenological reflection and it is a process that is far
from delivering a purely objective picture of the world.27
The point is that similar to Giere, Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that scientific observation provides
us with an objective picture of nature. Of course, they differ in their respective reasons for rejecting
this idea. Giere emphasizes that scientific instruments only engage with a limited aspect of nature.
25 For a discussion of unobservable scientific entities from a phenomenological perspective, cf. Wiltsche 2012 and 
Berghofer 2018b.
26 https://wlcg-public.web.cern.ch/about. Retrieved on February 13, 2020. In this context, cf., e.g., Karaca 2017, 344.
27 For discussions of what kind of observation is taking place in LHC experiments, cf., e.g., Beauchemin 2017, and 
Karaca 2017, 2018. Concerning the relationship between theory and observation, Beauchemin argues that reflection
on such big data experiments “indicates that the frontier between theory and observation is blurry and that the 
dichotomy theory-experiment should be revised” (Beauchemin 2017, 275). Although Beauchemin stresses the 
theory-ladenness of LHC experiments, he does not dispute the objectivity of the corresponding empirical facts. 
Similarly, Karaca argues that “the exploratory data selection procedure carried out in the ATLAS experiment is 
theory-laden in the sense that its implementation is crucially dependent on the aforementioned theoretical models 
that the experiment is aimed to test” (Karaca 2017, 350; cf. also Karaca 2018, 5449), insisting, however, that no 
vicious circularity is happening there (Karaca 2018, 5450). Werner Callebaut has explicitly argued that Giere’s 
perspectivism “provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues” 
surrounding big data biology (Callebaut 2012, 69).
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Merleau-Ponty seems to stress that according to quantum mechanics the act of observing inevitably
affects  the  observed  reality  (e.g.,  when  electrons,  depending  on  the  experimental  setup,  either
behave like particles or like waves).
Another important similarity to Giere is that Merleau-Ponty aims at establishing a position that is in
between objectivist realism and anti-realism, namely a version of realism that rejects the ideal of
providing a complete and purely objective view of the world and that takes into account the subject
that is doing science. To get a better grip on Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the scientific realism
debate,  let  us  see  which  positions  he  rejects.  One  might  think  that  phenomenologists  feel
sympathetic to instrumentalist accounts (and for some phenomenologists this is certainly true), but
Merleau-Ponty  clearly  opposes  such  views.  Merleau-Ponty  does  not  use  the  term
“instrumentalism,” but he introduces the following position:
Physics should not be conceived as a search for the truth, it should give up determining a real 
physics: it would be only an ensemble of measurements linked to equations, allowing [us] to 
foresee the result of future measurements. Formalist physics receives all freedom, but it loses its 
ontological content. It signifies no mode of being, no reality. (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 95f.)
This  position,  expressing  the  core  ideas  of  instrumentalism,  is  rejected  by  him without  much
argument.  For  Merleau-Ponty,  it  is  clear  that  physics,  correctly  interpreted,  indeed  tells  us
something significant about the nature of reality. Physics is not a mere tool to make predictions, nor
can reality be reduced to what is measured and observed.
He goes on, drawing on the work of the French physicist and logician Paulette Destouches-Fevrier,
to point out that it would also be a mistake to adopt an idealist position. The problem with idealism
is that just like standard realism it amounts to a form of objectivism. To be more precise, idealism is
an  objectivism  that  “objectifies  human  representations”  (Merleau-Ponty  2003,  96).  Instead,
Merleau-Ponty  is  convinced  that  “[t]he  relations  between  reality  and  measurement  must  be
conceived  outside  of  the  dichotomy  of  in-itself/representation”  (Merleau-Ponty  2003,  96).
Acknowledging that  “[p]hysics cannot  be realist  in the classical sense” but  “cannot  be idealist,
either,”  Merleau-Ponty  chooses  to  term  his  position  “a  ‘partial  realism’ or  a  ‘participationist’
conception”  (Merleau-Ponty  2003,  97f.).  This  terminology,  adopted  from Paulette  Destouches-
Fevrier, highlights the interrelatedness and inseparability of the observer and the observed. The term
“partial  realism”  emphasizes  that  although this  view is  not  a  traditional  form of  realism,  it  is
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supposed to be some form of realism. Returning to our initial question of how to place Merleau-
Ponty in  the  scientific  realism debate,  we  need  to  ask:  which  form of  realism?  What  are  the
fundamental objects of reality according to his partial realism, his participationist conception? 
In this context, he calls reality a “structural plane,” and continues by quoting a long passage from
Destouches-Fevrier.28 Here Destouches-Fevrier says that reality “transcends the opposition object-
subject.” The focus is on the “structural relations” between subject and object.  These structural
relations “refer not to an object, but to certain mathematical forms necessary for the description of
the relation of the subject to the object.” The ontological significance of the structural relations is
highlighted  by  pointing  out  that  “they  are  independent  of  the  results  of  the  processes  of
measurement”  and  by  perhaps  misleadingly  comparing  them  “to  the  Platonic  objectivity.”
(Destouches-Fevrier quoted in Merleau-Ponty 2003, 98).
Unfortunately,  Merleau-Ponty  does  not  do  much  to  clarify  or  go  beyond  these  remarks  of
Destouches-Fevrier.  However,  in  The Visible  and the Invisible he holds that  modern physics  is
obliged “to recognize as ultimate physical beings in full right relations between the observer and the
observed”  (Merleau-Ponty  1968,  15).  In  this  light,  there  is  little  doubt  that  Merleau-Ponty
subscribes to the structuralist view drafted by Destouches-Fevrier.
Accordingly,  concerning our questions of how to understand the fundamental  objects  of reality
according to Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism, we get the following answer: The fundamental objects
are the structural relations between the observer and the observed. These relations can neither be
reduced to the objective nor to the subjective. Reality transcends this opposition. Reality can only
be understood or even consists in the relations between the observer and the observed.29 Admittedly,
all this remains vague. However, in the next section, we shall see that there is a novel interpretation
of  quantum  mechanics  that  agrees  with  Merleau-Ponty  that  quantum  mechanics  should  be
28 Unfortunately, in the English translation (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 98), the quotation marks are missing.
29 Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism denies the existence of individual observer-independent physical objects and 
intrinsic properties. Instead, as we have seen, it regards the “structural relations” that refer “to certain mathematical 
forms necessary for the description of the relation of the subject to the object” as the fundamental entities. 
Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism has much common ground with structural realism. In current debates, 
structural realism is a form of selective realism that focuses on the mathematical structure of scientific theories. A 
distinction is made between epistemic and ontic structural realism. Broadly speaking, while epistemic structural 
realism says that structures are all we can know, ontic structural realism (OSR) says that structures are all there is. 
OSR enjoys much popularity and comes in many flavors, ranging from the claim that objects (at the fundamental 
level) do not possess intrinsic properties to the eliminativist version, according to which there are no objects but 
only structures (for more details, cf. Ladyman 2016 and Berghofer 2018c). Of course, the difference between 
Merleau-Ponty and proponents of OSR is that the latter do not regard their structural relations as relations between 
subject and object. Proponents of OSR presuppose the observer-independence of physical reality.
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understood as revealing the fundamental relatedness between subject and object: QBism. Before
turning to a more substantial discussion of quantum mechanics, let me briefly recapitulate and put
into perspective what we have achieved so far. 
In section 1, we have seen that for Giere science is an agent-based endeavor. This idea is fleshed out
by Husserl  in  terms  of  the  life-world  serving as  the  meaning-foundation  for  all  the  individual
sciences. Merleau-Ponty radicalizes this idea by making the ontological claim that reality is in some
sense observer-dependent (perhaps not necessarily mind-dependent). Of course, phenomenologists
are not committed to this strong claim of observer-dependence, ontologically understood. Husserl
argues  that  subjectivity  and  subjective  experiences  constitute  the  source  of  all  knowledge  and
justification  but  this  is  an  epistemological  claim and  Husserl’s  transcendental  idealism can  be
interpreted as a methodological-epistemological project free from strong metaphysical implications.
According to Husserl’s understanding of the mathematical sciences including theoretical physics,
these sciences strive for a maximum of objectivity by looking at the world from the third-person
perspective, mathematizing and quantizing their target system. And although full objectivity can
never be gained because the scientists’ life-worlds remain the epistemic grounding and meaning-
foundations  for  all  scientific  theories,  for  Husserl  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  the  individual
sciences to  proceed in  this  manner.30 We only need to  be careful  in  how to interpret  scientific
theories and be aware of their limitations.31
Merleau-Ponty goes beyond such interpretational claims. There is at least one methodological and
one ontological claim he adds.32 The methodological claim is that the sciences, particularly physics,
must refrain from aiming at a purely objective account of the world. Instead, they must incorporate
the first-person perspective into science. Only by doing so can science unveil the most fundamental
structures of reality. The ontological claim is that reality is essentially observer-dependent and that
the  fundamental  objects  are  relations  between  the  observer  and the  observed.  Merleau-Ponty’s
position seems to qualify as a version of perspectival realism since he rejects objectivist realism and
30 However, it should be mentioned that there are some passages in Husserl’s oeuvre that suggest that physics in its 
most elaborated form would successfully make the physicist and her life-world subjects of investigation, 
abandoning the idea of a purely objective third-person perspective (Husserl 1970, 295; 2002, 287). It is not entirely 
clear, however, whether here Husserl wants to say that physics must be phenomenologically clarified so that 
physics (as it is) can be ultimately grounded and justified. Or whether his claim is to be understood in the Merleau-
Pontyan sense that physics can only succeed in its goal of clarifying nature if it succeeds in incorporating the 
physicist into the physical theories.
31 “There is no pure third-person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. This is, of course, not to say that 
there is no third-person perspective, but merely that such a perspective is, precisely, a perspective from somewhere. 
It is a view that we can adopt on the world.” (Zahavi 2019, 54)
32 Cf. the beginning of section 2 for a similar distinction we made in the context of perspectivism.
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aims  at  a  position  in  between  objectivist  realism  and  anti-realism.  Scientific  theories  are
perspectival  in  the  sense  that  they  need  to  incorporate  the  scientists’ relations  to  the  objects.
Scientific  facts  are  perspectival  in  the sense  that  they depend on,  or,  perhaps  more  accurately,
consist of the scientists’ relations to the objects. 
Nevertheless, one might doubt that Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism is a form of realism after all.
This is because scientific realism is usually associated with an ontological commitment to the mind-
independence of reality. However, we have to note, first, that Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism does
not amount to a form of traditional anti-realism (instrumentalism, idealism, constructivism) and,
secondly and more importantly, that Merleau-Ponty would strongly deny the anti-realist claim that
the sciences cannot tell us anything about the nature of reality. In this regard of aiming to be in
between  standard  versions  of  realism  and  anti-realism,  Merleau-Ponty’s  partial  realism  shares
significant  similarities  with  QBism,  classified  by  its  chief  advocate  Christopher  Fuchs  as  a
“participatory realism.” Fuchs insists that quantum mechanics must be understood “as being part of
a realist program, i.e., as an attempt to say something about what the world is like, how it is put
together,  and  what’s  the  stuff  of  it”  (Fuchs  2017,  117).  Importantly,  according  to  Fuchs,  the
conclusions he draws from quantum mechanics are not something we need to artificially read into
it. Quite the contrary, “[q]uantum theory itself threw these considerations before us!” (Fuchs 2017,
115). This means we need to take quantum mechanics, its features and phenomena, at face value
and by doing so we learn something new about reality that was hidden in classical physics. 
I  believe  that  this  perfectly  captures  Merleau-Ponty’s  attitude  towards  quantum  mechanics.
Quantum mechanics does not deliver a purely objective view on the world as the objectivist realist
would have it; instead, quantum mechanics shows us that a purely objective view on the world is
impossible.  Quantum  mechanics  does  not  represent  an  observer-independent  reality;  instead,
quantum mechanics calls into question the idea that there is a purely observer-independent reality
behind  the  phenomena.  How  quantum  mechanics  might  support  perspectivist  and
phenomenological approaches to science and how QBism relates to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are the
topics of the following section.
5. QBism
In quantum mechanics we find many concepts and phenomena that seem to support perspectivist
and phenomenological approaches to science  and reality,  undermining our classical world-view.
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Determinism is called into question, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle imposes certain limitations
on what we can know about reality, and complementarity and entanglement are often viewed as
revealing that acts of measurement necessarily affect observed reality. Particularly in the early days
of quantum mechanics, complementarity was considered the key feature of quantum mechanics and
was interpreted in a way that seems to support a perspectivist picture. Heisenberg summarized the
Copenhagen understanding of complementarity as follows: 
By this term ‘complementarity’ Bohr intended to characterize the fact that the same phenomenon
can sometimes be described by very different, possibly even contradictory pictures, which are 
complementary in the sense that both pictures are necessary if the ‘quantum’ character of the 
phenomenon shall be made visible. (Heisenberg 1977, 6)
Wave-particle  duality  and  Heisenberg’s  uncertainty  principle  are  often  considered  the  most
prominent  manifestations  of  complementarity.  Heisenberg’s  uncertainty principle  famously says
that with respect to complementary variables such as position and momentum the more precisely we
determine the one, the less we know about the other. As Heisenberg himself noted this implies that
“[e]ven in principle we cannot know the present in all detail” (Heisenberg 1983, 83).  Concerning
measurements  in  quantum  mechanics,  Frescura  and  Hiley  express  a  common  attitude  among
physicists when they say that the issues surrounding complementarity imply
that not all aspects of a system can be viewed simultaneously. By using one particular piece of 
apparatus only certain features could be made manifest at the expense of others, while with a 
different piece of apparatus another complementary aspect could be made manifest in such a way
that the original set became non-manifest, that is, the original attributes were no longer well 
defined (Frescura & Hiley 1984).
This claim that scientific instruments can only shed light on certain limited aspects of reality is
precisely  the  claim  we  find  in  Giere  (2006,  chapter  3)  as  discussed  in  section  1.  However,
concerning the examples discussed by Giere, one might argue that one could simply add all the
perspectives  delivered  by  different  instruments  to  gain  one  complete  picture  of  reality.
Complementarity in quantum mechanics, on the other hand, seems to impose even more rigorous
limitations on scientific observations, revealing a genuinely perspectival element of science that
disallows gaining one complete picture by adding different perspectives: An increase of information
with respect to one set of properties goes hand in hand with a decrease of information with respect
to another set of properties. In this picture, quantum mechanics reveals limits to objectivity in the
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sense that our knowledge of quantum systems is necessarily perspectival, we can always only know
certain aspects, never nature in its entirety.
Of course,  drawing such conclusions from quantum mechanics is  a  minefield since there is  no
consensus  on  its  ontological  as  well  as  epistemological  implications.  Interpreting  quantum
mechanics, offering a solution to the notorious measurement problem, is often considered the main
topic of philosophy of physics. As a consequence, there exist a number of different interpretations
that lead to very different pictures of reality. This is true also for the question of which conclusions
to draw from Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (cf. Hilgevoord & Uffink 2016).33
Many open questions in quantum mechanics concern the wave function and its apparent collapse. Is
the wave function something that really exists or is it merely a mathematical tool, useful to make
predictions? Why is it that apparently the outcomes of measurements are always definite states?
Does the wave function collapse upon measurement? If so, how and why? This is where so-called
interpretations of quantum mechanics usually come into play. Some of them, most notably Bohmian
mechanics and the many-worlds interpretation, preserve (in some sense and with some costs) the
deterministic  picture  we  know  from  classical  mechanics.  Proponents  of  these  interpretations
typically view the wave function as physically real and believe that quantum mechanics provides an
objective picture of reality. Other interpretations, such as Rovelli’s relational interpretation (Rovelli
1996),  Dieks’ perspectivalism (Dieks  2019a;  2019b),  or  Healey’s  pragmatist  approach  (Healey
2012) in one way or another contest the idea that physics delivers a purely objective picture of the
world. One interpretation in this camp that has gained particular attention recently is QBism. I shall
focus on QBism also because the ideas and the terminology we find here are particularly close to
what we found in Merleau-Ponty.
To be sure,  I  do  not claim that perspectivists  or phenomenologists  must or should subscribe to
QBism. Nor do I  argue that  they are  committed to  any “subjective” interpretation of  quantum
mechanics. However, QBism might be the interpretation that most consistently promotes some of
the ideas we find in phenomenology, which is why it is worth considering it in more detail. 
In QBism the agent and her experiences and expectations play a central role. The distinctive idea of
QBism is to apply a personalist Bayesian account of probability, as it has been developed by Bruno
33 However, it should be mentioned that even in deterministic Bohmian mechanics, “there are unavoidable limitations 
to our knowledge of particles. In fact, once the wave function is prepared, there is an absolute uncertainty regarding
the positions of the particles” (Solé et al. 2016, 22).
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de  Finetti,  to  quantum  probabilities.  This  means  that  probabilities  in  quantum  mechanics are
interpreted not as objective but as subjective probabilities. Accordingly, in QBism quantum states
do not represent objective reality but instead represent an agent's subjective degrees of beliefs about
her future experiences. Consequently, the wave function is not physically real but a mathematical
tool that encodes one’s expectations about one’s future experiences.  In short, QBism argues that
quantum states do “not represent an element of physical reality but an agentʼs personal probability
assignments, reflecting his subjective degrees of belief about the future content of his experience”
(Fuchs & Schack 2015, 1).
The first thing to note is that even opponents of any subjective interpretation of quantum mechanics
concede that such an account delivers a straightforward solution to the notorious apparent collapse
of the wave function. This is because any “approach according to which the wave function is not
something  real,  but  represents  a  subjective  information,  explains  the  collapse  at  quantum
measurement perfectly: it is just a process of updating the information the observer has” (Vaidman
2014, 17). To put it differently, according to QBism “[t]he notorious ‘collapse of the wave-function’
is nothing but the updating of an agent’s state assignment on the basis of her experience” (Fuchs et
al. 2014, 749). In this sense, QBism dissolves the measurement problem – the problem does not
even show up.34
A further advantage of QBism is that it avoids certain implausible consequences that plague realist
interpretations  of the wave function.  Mathematically speaking,  wave functions  are  vectors  in  a
Hilbert  space.  This  is  often expressed by saying that  “Wave functions live in Hilbert  space”
(Griffiths 2018, 94). A Hilbert space is an abstract mathematical concept, namely a complete vector
space on which an inner product is defined. But if the wave function is something real, does this
mean that mathematical Hilbert space is physically real too? In fact, one can find prominent voices
championing  Hilbert  space  realism  (e.g.  Carroll  &  Singh  2019)  but  most  consider  this  an
implausible  and  unwarranted  mathematization  of  nature  and  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  only
“[v]ery few people are willing to defend Hilbert space realism in print” (Wallace 2013, 216).
A similar but more subtle form of mathematization takes place in configuration space realism, i.e.,
the project of reifying the 3N-dimensional configuration space, N being the number of the particles
in the universe. The main proponent of this view is David Albert, who at one point considered our
34 Similarly, QBism dissolves another problem that has been puzzling physicists, namely non-locality (cf. Fuchs et al. 
2014 and Timpson 2008). 
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impression that we live in three-dimensional space “somehow flatly illusory” (Albert 1996, 277).
Configuration space realism, often referred to as “wave function realism,” has been quite popular
and has sparked much controversy. However, if configuration space realism is meant to imply that
the  physical  space of  our  everyday experiences  is  demoted to  some kind of  illusion,  then  this
position  is  in  danger  of  being  empirically  incoherent.35 Furthermore,  one  might  object  that
configuration  space  realism  “makes  the  same  unmotivated  conceptual  move  as  Hilbert  space
realism: it reifies a mathematical space without any particular justification” (Wallace 2013, 217).
Concerning the formal and technical apparatus of the mathematical sciences, Husserl warned us not
to be “misled into taking these formulae and their formula-meaning for the true being of nature
itself” (Husserl 1970, 44). We see that this problem also arises in quantum mechanics via wave
function realism. The most common realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, the many-worlds
interpretation,  Bohmian  mechanics,  and  GRW  theory  are  all  in  danger  of  leading  to  a
mathematization of nature that is not based on physical principles but on mathematical formalism.
QBists such as Christopher Fuchs and Blake Stacey have pointed out that in these interpretations
“the strategy has been to reify or objectify all the mathematical symbols of the theory and then
explore whatever comes of the move” (Fuchs & Stacey 2019, 136). 
QBism takes  a  different  approach.  Instead  of  reifying  mathematical  constructs,  the  idea  is  “to
reduce the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics to some crisp physical statements” (Fuchs
& Stacey 2016, 285). In this respect, QBism is similar to informational approaches to quantum
mechanics that seek to reconstruct quantum mechanics based on fundamental physical principles
(cf., e.g., Bub 2004, Chiribella et al. 2011, and Goyal 2012). A common idea is that “[i]n quantum
mechanics,  maximal information  is not complete and cannot be completed” (Caves et al 2002, 3)
and according to QBists this result “can be regarded as the greatest triumph of Bayesian reasoning”
(Caves et al 2002, 3). I take it to be a virtue of QBism to resonate well with recent developments in
quantum information  theory  and  the  insistence  that  information  is  necessarily  incomplete  also
resonates well with perspectivism.
So far, we have seen that the key move of QBism is to interpret quantum probabilities as personalist
Bayesian probabilities and that this move allows QBism to dissolve the measurement problem and
to avoid implausible mathematizations of nature. But what about more substantive claims about
35 This objection has been raised, e.g., by Chen (2019, 6). For how the objection of empirical incoherence emerges 
from phenomenological reasoning, cf. the beginning of section 2 of the present paper, particularly footnote 11.
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how reality  works?  Does  QBism amount  to  some sort  of  instrumentalism according  to  which
quantum mechanics does not teach us anything about reality? Indeed, the charge of instrumentalism
is one of the most common objections to QBism.
Importantly,  proponents  of  QBism,  particularly Christopher  Fuchs,  vehemently deny such anti-
realist  interpretations  of  QBism.  Instead,  Fuchs  argues  that,  according  to  QBism,  quantum
mechanics  tells us something very important about reality, namely “that reality is  more  than any
third-person perspective can capture” (Fuchs 2017, 113).  In this  spirit,  one of the objectives of
QBism is to put the scientist back into science (Mermin 2014). Fuchs chose the label “participatory
realism” for QBism due to the prominent role that the subject and her experiences play in QBism,
highlighting the interrelatedness of subject and object (Fuchs 2017).
Interpreting probabilities in quantum mechanics as subjective probabilities is only the starting point
of the QBist project. The idea is that the fact that quantum mechanics does not deliver a purely
objective picture of reality is not a shortcoming of the theory, instead quantum mechanics tells us
that reality does not allow being objectively captured at a fundamental level.
But what exactly does it mean when Fuchs calls QBism a “participatory realism”? How exactly are
subject and object interrelated? Arguably, this concerns the most challenging aspect of QBism and it
does  not  seem that  a  comprehensive  philosophical  foundation  has  been offered  to  address  this
question. However, to get a better idea of what QBists have in mind, we turn to the concept of
measurement. According to QBism, “[a] measurement does not, as the term unfortunately suggests,
reveal a pre-existing state of affairs. It is an action on the world by an agent that results in the
creation of an outcome—a new experience for that agent” (Fuchs et al. 2014, 749). We remember
that in  the context of quantum measurement  Merleau-Ponty said that  “[t]he apparatus does not
present the object to us” but “realizes a sampling of this phenomenon as well as a fixation. […]
Known nature is artificial nature” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 93). Merleau-Ponty and QBists agree that
in quantum mechanics the agent is not an innocent bystander. Instead, measurement is an active,
participatory act: “Measurement is not a passive process, but instead a fundamentally participatory
one” (Fuchs & Stacey 2019, 163).
According to this participatory realism, there is an agent (or a plurality of agents) and an external
physical system, and by acting upon the system the agent creates outcomes and these outcomes are
the subject matter of quantum mechanics (Fuchs & Stacey 2019, 180). In this  sense, “quantum
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mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world; it deals with the experiences of that
objective world that belong to whatever particular agent is making use of quantum theory” (Fuchs
et al. 2014, 750). Importantly, the agent cannot be reduced to the physical system and the concept of
agency is not derivable from quantum mechanics (Fuchs & Stacey 2019, 180).
Even more importantly, this is not to be understood in a Kantian sense such that true reality is
hidden behind the phenomena. “In a QBist understanding of quantum theory, it is not that nature is
hidden from us. It is that it is not all there yet and never will be; nature is being hammered out as we
speak” (Fuchs in Schlosshauer 2011, 285). In this picture, “there is no such thing as the universe in
any completed and waiting-to-be-discovered sense” (Fuchs in Schlosshauer 2011, 285).
Let us summarize how QBism relates to the scientific realism debate. QBism is  not realist in the
sense that it reifies the mathematical symbols that occur in the formalism of quantum mechanics.
Particularly,  the  wave function  is  not  interpreted as  something that  exists  physically.  However,
QBism is  anti-instrumentalist since it holds that there are very important lessons about reality we
can learn from quantum mechanics. We learn that we live in a participatory universe and  “that
reality is  more  than any  third-person perspective can capture” (Fuchs 2017, 113). QBism is not
solipsist since it presupposes the existence of an external system upon which the agent acts, but it
remains unclear how exactly to view the relationship between the agent and physical reality.
There is general consensus that QBism delivers  a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics
that  avoids  problems surrounding the  apparent  collapse  of  the  wave  function  and  non-locality.
However, there seems to be a lack of a clear philosophical foundation. “Now, as a formal proposal,
quantum  Bayesianism is  relatively  clear  and  well  developed.  But  it  is  rather  less  transparent
philosophically” (Timpson 2008, 580). Perspectivist and phenomenological approaches to science
and physics might help QBism to find a suitable philosophical foundation.
What should be clear from this section is that there are many systematically significant  parallels
between Fuchs’ participatory realism and Merleau-Ponty’s partial realism. Both emphasize the role
of  the  subject  (agent)  and  her  experiences  and  draw attention  to  the  relationship  between  the
observer and the observed (the agent and the external system). Both insist that the physicist is not an
innocent  bystander,  rejecting  the  idea  that  scientific  observation  provides  us  with  an  objective
picture of nature. Both abstain from mathematizing nature but declare that quantum mechanics quite
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straightforwardly tells us something very important about the nature and structure of reality. The
lessons they draw, of course, are very different from what is claimed by objectivist realists.
One lesson, namely the idea that a purely objective third-person perspective on the world is either
impossible or cannot capture all of nature, is at the heart of any perspectivist account. It plays an
important role in the phenomenological tradition where we find various degrees of perspectivism.
The phenomenological tradition offers a rich experience-first epistemology, developing concepts
such as  horizontal intentionality and  life-world  that could prove immensely useful for advancing
perspectivism. The present paper is supposed to pave the way for further attempts to introduce a
phenomenological perspectivism into the philosophy of science.
Conclusion
Perspectivism is a new and promising approach to the scientific realism debate that aims at a middle
way  between  traditional  forms  of  scientific  realism and  anti-realism.  Perspectivism rejects  an
objectivist picture, according to which the sciences deliver an exhaustive account of nature that is
free from all subjective factors. Instead, perspectivism views science as an agent-based endeavor
that delivers a certain perspective on nature. This is not to say that the world does not have the
features ascribed to it by science, but to deny that there is nothing to know about the world over and
above what is described by our best (possible) scientific theories. Although perspectivism is a novel
position  in  current  debates,  it  does  have  its  forerunners.  The present  paper  discusses  to  which
degree  perspectivist  ideas  can  be  found  in  the  phenomenological  tradition.  We have  seen  that
Husserl’s account of horizontal intentionality supplements Giere’s analysis of human observation.
What is more, Husserl’s claim that all science is epistemically grounded in the life-world and thus
can never be entirely free from subjective factors, fits well with Giere’s account of the perspectival
character of scientific theories. Then, we have seen how Merleau-Ponty radicalizes this idea by
making  the  further  methodological  claim  that  the  sciences  must  incorporate  the  first-person
perspective into science and the ontological claim that reality is in some sense observer-dependent.
Importantly,  Merleau-Ponty contends that these are lessons that are motivated by science itself,
namely  by  quantum  mechanics.  In  this  respect,  Merleau-Ponty’s  partial  realism  is  in  perfect
agreement  with  Fuchs’ participatory  realism.  In  the  final  section,  we  indicated  how  quantum
mechanics  could  support  perspectivist  and phenomenological  approaches  and we shed light  on
QBism which is an interpretation of quantum mechanics particularly close to the ideas we find in
Merleau-Ponty.
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